Your World of Legal Intelligence
 Hong Kong | 1-800-335-6202

Hksar v Wong Hin Wai

Judgment Cited authorities 25 Cited in Precedent Map Related
Vincent
Judgment Date18 November 2013
Year2013
Citation(2013) 16 HKCFAR 837
Judgement NumberFACC13/2012
Subject MatterFinal Appeal (Criminal)
CourtCourt of Final Appeal (Hong Kong)
FACC12/2012 HKSAR v. CHOW NOK HANG

FACC No 12, 13& 14 of 2012

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FINAL APPEAL NOS12, 13 AND 14 OF 2012 (CRIMINAL)

(ON APPEAL FROM HCMA NO 193 OF 2012)

_______________________

FACC No 12 of 2012

BETWEEN

HKSAR Respondent
and
CHOW NOK HANG（周諾恆） Appellant

_______________________

FACC No 13 of 2012

BETWEEN

HKSAR Respondent
and
WONG HIN WAI（黃軒瑋） Appellant

_______________________

FACC No 14 of 2012

BETWEEN

HKSAR Appellant
and
CHOW NOK HANG（周諾恆） 1stRespondent
WONG HIN WAI（黃軒瑋） 2nd Respondent

_______________________

Court: Mr Justice Chan Acting CJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Tang PJ, Mr Justice Litton NPJ and Lord Millett NPJ
Date of Hearing: 9 October 2013
Date of Judgment: 18 November 2013

_______________________

J U D G M E N T

_______________________

Mr Justice Chan, Acting CJ:

1. The freedom of expression may take many forms. As was involved in the present case, they include the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of demonstration. The right to the freedom of expression is guaranteed by art 27 of the Basic Law and art 17 of the Bill of Rights. This is a fundamental right to enable any person to air his grievances and to express his views on matters of public interest. In a free and democratic society, there are bound to be conflicts of interest and differences in opinion. It is important that those who purport to exercise the right to the freedom of expression must also respect the rights of others and must not abuse such right. Conflicts and differences are to be resolved through dialogue and compromise. Resorting to violence or threat of violence or breach of the peace in the exercise of this right will not advance one’s cause. On the contrary, this will weaken the merits of the cause and result in loss of sympathy and support. The means to achieve a legitimate end must not only be peaceful, it must also be lawful. Violent or unlawful means cannot justify an end however noble. It may also attract criminal liability.

2. The right to freedom of expression, like all fundamental rights and freedoms, must be given a generous interpretation. (See Ng Ka Ling & others v Director of Immigration (1999) 2 HKCFAR 4.) But this right is not absolute and may be subject to restrictions as prescribed by law in the interest of public order and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. See art 39(2) of the Basic Law and art 17 of the Bill of Rights. Any law which purports to restrict such right must be narrowly interpreted and the restriction must satisfy the test of necessity and proportionality. See Yeung May Wan & others v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 137 and Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229 (which were cases on the right of assembly and the right of demonstration). In construing the relevant statutory provisions which have the effect of restricting such right, the court must have regard to competing public interests, including the maintenance of public order and the rights and freedoms of others. The right balance has to be struck between the preservation of public order and the exercise of the individual’s rights and freedoms and between the competing rights and freedoms of individuals or groups of individuals.

3. As described in Mr Justice Tang PJ’s judgment and shown on the videos, the conduct of the appellants was disgraceful. They showed absolutely no regard or respect for the rights of others and had abused the right to freedom of expression. The 1st appellant’s conduct was, to say the least, distasteful and the 2nd appellant’s conduct constituted a breach of the peace and an assault. Although they could have been charged with or guilty of some other offences, the question in these appeals is, however, whether their conduct also incurred criminal liability under s.17B of the Public Order Ordinance, Cap 245.

4. There is no challenge on the constitutionality of s.17B. It is clear from the language of this provision that s.17B(2) is aimed at preventing the outbreak of public disorder and s.17B(1) at protecting the rights and freedoms of others in transacting their normal business.

5. Both s.17B(1) and s.17B(2) require proof of disorderly conduct: “acts in a disorderly manner” in s.17B(1) and “behaves … in a disorderly manner” in s.17B(2). Although the 2nd appellant does not dispute his conduct was disorderly, the 1st appellant argues that what he did was not. I must say that this term has caused me some difficulty. I was initially attracted to Mr Justice Tang’s analysis. But having considered the matter further, I would, with respect, prefer to adopt the approach taken by Mr Justice Ribeiro.

6. There is no definition in the statutory provision and no comprehensive definition by any court of this term “acts/behaves in a disorderly manner”. Section 17B had its origin in s.5 of the Public Order Act 1936 in the UK. In Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854, which dealt with the meaning of “insulting words” in that section, Lord Reid said (at p.861) that the meaning of an ordinary word of a statute is a question of fact for the trial court. This approach was adopted by the Divisional Court in Chambers v DPP [1995] Crim L R 896 which held that “disorderly behavior” were to be treated as words in ordinary everyday use. This was followed by Beeson J in HKSAR v Cheng Siu Wing [2003] 4 HKC 471 who held that these words “are to be treated as words in everyday use and given their normal meaning”. It was also accepted that the disorderly conduct in s.5 of the 1936 Act (s.17B of our Ordinance) need not involve any element of violence (Chambers v DPP) or amount to a breach of the peace (Campbell v Adair [1945] JC 29).

7. In New Zealand, disorderly behavior in a public place is an offence under s.4(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 albeit punishable only with a maximum fine of $1000. Another section, s.3, creates a more serious offence which requires an element similar but not exactly the same as that in our s.17B(2). The Supreme Court of New Zealand in Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 held that disorderly behavior in s.4(1)(a) (the lesser offence) means behavior seriously disruptive of public order. This was followed in Morse v Police [2012] 2 NZLR 1. One would expect that the Supreme Court of New Zealand would give the same meaning to “disorderly behavior” in the more serious s.3 offence (similar to our s.17B(2)). It is however important to note that it was considered necessary by the Supreme Court of New Zealand to set a high threshold for disorderly behavior as an offence.

8. Unlike the position in New Zealand, it is not an offence in Hong Kong to behave in a disorderly manner in public. To constitute an offence under s.17B(1), an accused must have acted in a disorderly manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the business of a public gathering and for an offence under s.17B(2), he must have behaved in a disorderly manner either with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or that a breach of the peace is likely to be caused by his conduct. The reasons in the New Zealand cases for imposing a higher threshold including constitutionality considerations do not necessarily apply with the same force in Hong Kong.

9. Further, not only is disorderly behavior by itself not an offence, s.17B(2) refers also to other types of behavior such as using, distributing, displaying writing containing threatening, abusive or insulting words. These other types of behavior do not necessarily involve a serious disruption of public order. Also, neither s.17B(1) nor 17B(2) requires proof that there is an actual serious disruption of public order, only that the disorderly behavior was done with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or had the likely effect of causing a breach of the peace. It is unlikely and I do not believe that the legislature intends by “acts/behaves in a disorderly manner” in s.17B to mean conduct causing a serious disruption of public order.

10. Hence, I am more inclined to follow the English authorities and accept that the term “acts/behaves in a disorderly manner” should be given an ordinary and everyday meaning and that whether there is disorderly conduct for the purpose of s.17B is a question of fact for the trial court having regard to the nature and manner of the conduct and the circumstances of the case. As Gleeson CJ said in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, at para. 12:

“Concepts of what is disorderly, or indecent, or offensive, vary with time and place, and may be affected by the circumstances in which the relevant conduct occurs.”

11. The s.17B(2) offence also requires the prosecution to prove that the accused in behaving in a disorderly manner has the intent to provoke a breach of the peace or that a breach of the peace is likely to be caused by his conduct. With regard to this element of the offence, I would like to make the following observations. For the sake of brevity, I would use the term disorderly conduct to include also using, distributing or displaying any writing containing threatening, abusive or insulting words.

12. First, as pointed out earlier, this offence is aimed at preventing an outbreak of public disorder. Although in most cases, the accused’s disorderly conduct would probably have constituted a breach of the peace or some offence already, it is not necessary to show that his conduct has actually provoked or caused others to commit a breach of the peace. It is sufficient to show that there is a real or imminent risk that others would breach the peace or resort to violence as a result of the accused’s disorderly conduct.

13. Secondly, the fact that the accused’s disorderly conduct...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT