Your World of Legal Intelligence
 Hong Kong | 1-800-335-6202

Attorney General v Pat Chiuk Wah And Others

Judgment Cited authorities 26 Cited in Precedent Map Related
Vincent
Judgment Date20 March 1969
Year1969
Judgement NumberCACC639/1968
Subject MatterCriminal Appeal
CourtCourt of Appeal (Hong Kong)
CACC000639/1968 ATTORNEY GENERAL v. PAT CHIUK WAH AND OTHERS

CACC000639/1968

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 639 OF 1968

BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Appellant

AND
1. PAT CHIUK WAH Respondents
2. YEUNG KWONG FAT
3. SHUM KIANG BOR
4. NG SHUI WOO

-----------------

Coram: Hogan, C.J., Rigby, S.P.J. & Mills-Owens, J.

Date: 20 March 1969

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

Rigby, S.P.J.:

1. On the 18th of July, 1968, a police party raided certain premises in Hong Kong. There they found a printing press in, or upon, which stamps were actually being printed or processed at the time of the arrival of the police. The stamps bore a close resemblance to, and were clearly intended to pass as, National Health Insurance Stamps of the United Kingdom issued under, or in direct connection with, a fund under the control and management of the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance in connection with the provisions of the United Kingdom National Insurance Act 1965-1967. As a result the defendants, in different capacities, were charged in the District Court with forgery of valuable securities contrary to section 4(2)(a) of the Forgery Ordinance (Cap. 209), possession of forged documents, contrary to section 10(3), and possession of implements of forgery contrary to section 11(d) and (e) of the Ordinance.

2. At the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, the learned trial judge ruled, as a matter of law, that the defendants had no case to answer on any of the charges and he accordingly discharged them. The Attorney General now appeals, by way of case stated, against the dismissal of the charges under sections 4(2)(a) and 11(d) and (e).

3. Before proceeding any further it is, I think, directly relevant to say that section 7(4)(a) of the Ordinance deals with the forgery of seals or dies. Under section 2 of the Ordinance "die" includes a "stamp", and a stamp is itself defined to include a stamp "impressed by means of a die as well as an adhesive stamp". The maximum penalty for any offence under this section, namely section 7(4)(a), is 7 years' imprisonment. Mr. Sandor, Crown Counsel, at some stage in the course of his able argument, frankly admitted that in drafting the indictment in this case he had overlooked section 7(4)(a) and he conceded - a concession with which I am in agreement other than to say that in my view that concession does not go far enough - that it might well have been the appropriate section under which to draft this charge. But he contended that the charge might also be preferred under section 4(2)(a) as forgery of a "valuable security". Section 4(2)(a) provides, upon conviction, for a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment. If Mr. Sandor's argument is correct that a stamp can properly be regarded as a "valuable security" one therefore gets the curious position that the Crown may elect to charge the forger of such a stamp either under section 7(4)(a), which carries a maximum penalty of 7 years' imprisonment or, alternatively, under section 4(2)(a) which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, for what is precisely the same offence. Possibly that apparently blatant inconsistency would not, in itself, provide a valid reason for such a charge not being brought under section 4(2)(a) if, as a matter of law, an insurance stamp can properly be regarded as a "valuable security".

4. Before turning to the definition under the Ordinance as to what constitutes a "valuable security" I, for my part, as a matter of ordinary common parlance, find myself quite unable to accept or regard an unused or unstamped stamp as falling within the ordinary connotation or meaning of what I would have regarded as a "valuable security". For myself, I would have thought that in common parlance a "valuable security" is some instrument or document that provides evidence of a right, title or interest to property or goods, e.g. an title deed, a share certificate, or even a pawnbroker's ticket.

5. The question then arises whether a stamp can be brought within the definition of "valuable security" as defined in section 2 of the Ordinance.

6. Valuable security is there defined to include:-

(1) "any writing entitling or evidencing the title of any person to any share or interest in any public stock, annuity, fund or debt of any part of Her Majesty's dominions or of any foreign state."
(2) "Any script, debenture, bill ...... or other security for the delivery or transfer of goods or chattels ......"
(3) "Any accountable receipt, release or discharge."
(4) "Any receipt or other instrument evidencing the payment of money or the delivery of any chattel personal."

7. The scheme of National Insurance in the United Kingdom provides for the payment of weekly contributions into a fund known as the National Insurance Fund at varying rates. Contributions are payable by affixing a stamp to an insurance card kept by, or on behalf of, an insured person in the space indicated for that purpose on the card. The cards are surrendered to the Ministry when making a claim for benefits. The stamps are adhesive stamps, purchased from the Post Office, and affixed by the contributor or his employer to the card specially provided for the purpose. Immediately after the stamp has been affixed it must be cancelled by writing in ink, or by stamping, the date upon which it is affixed. Thereafter the contributor is entitled, upon production and surrender of the stamped card, to certain benefits, subject to certain conditions. The face value of stamps not used or inadvertently spoiled may be recovered from the Ministry of Inland Revenue, but not as of right.

8. Mr. Sandor conceded, and in my view rightly conceded, that he could not successfully argue that an unused National Health Insurance Stamp was a "writing entitling or evidencing the title of any person to any share or interest in any public fund" and that such an argument could not arise unless and until the stamp has been affixed to the card and cancelled by writing in ink, or stamping, the date upon which it was affixed, so as to give the contributor a claim to benefits out of the fund. Again, as I understood his argument, he did not seek - and in my view rightly so - to place any weight upon any argument that such a stamp could be described as an "accountable receipt". For myself, I am unable to appreciate how a stamp such as this could be regarded as an "accountable receipt". He based the weight of his argument upon the contention that a stamp fell within the final limb of the definition as "an instrument evidencing the payment of money". Mr. Sandor contended that the words "instrument" or "document" were synonymous. He referred to the definition of "document" contained in the Interpretation Ordinance and to the two cases of The Queen v. Riley(1) and Rex. v. Cade(2).

9. In Riley's case the question turned upon whether a fraudulently ante-dated telegram sent to a bookmaker placing a bet on a horse - a telegram purporting to have been sent before the race was run - was a "forged instrument" within the meaning of section 38 of the Forgery Act 1861. A bench of five judges, albeit two of them expressing doubt, held that the telegram was an instrument within the meaning of the section. Hawkins J., in the course of his judgment said:

"I am not aware of any authority for saying that in law the term 'instrument' has ever been confined to any definite class of legal documents. In the absence of such authority, I cannot but think the term ought to be interpreted according to its generally understood and ordinary meaning, as stated in the dictionaries of Dr. Johnson and of Webster .............................................. When applied to a writing, Dr. Johnson defines it as 'a writing - a writing containing any contract or order.' Webster's definition is 'a writing expressive of some act, contract, process, or proceeding."

Wills J., in the course of his judgment, said:

"...... there is every reason why sections inserted for the purpose of advancing justice by getting rid of mere useless technicalities should be applied to forgeries of every description."

Later on he said:

"I cannot see anything in the nature of such a section which should make it necessary or desirable to restrict the application of the word 'instrument' to writings of a formal character, and I think it is meant to include writings of every description if false and known to be false by the person who makes use of them for the purpose indicated."

Later he said:

"I think further that, even if the true construction of the word 'instrument' required a more restricted meaning, the telegram in the present case would fall within it. It was a writing which, if accepted and acted upon, would establish a business relation and lead directly to business dealings with another person."

10. In Cade's case the question was whether a letter purporting to come from, and to be signed by, a man employed by the prosecutor to whom it was addressed, and requesting the payment of one pound, could be regarded as a "forged instrument" within the meaning of section 7 of the Forgery Act 1913, on a prosecution under that section for obtaining money by means of a forged instrument. That court, holding itself bound by Riley's case, held that the letter was a forged instrument within the meaning of section 7. In the course of his judgment in that case Lord Reading, L.C.J., delivering the judgment of the court, adopting the words of Wills J. in Riley's case, said:

"The document is really a business document; in the words of wills J. in Reg. v. Riley it is 'a writing which, if accepted and acted upon, would establish a business relation and lead...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT