Li Cheong v Lee Kwai Tai Also Known As Li Kwai Tai

CourtCourt of Appeal (Hong Kong)
Judgment Date18 October 2018
Neutral Citation[2018] HKCA 719
Judgement NumberCACV346/2018
Subject MatterCivil Appeal
CAMP65A/2018 LI CHEONG v. LEE KWAI TAI also known as LI KWAI TAI

CAMP 65/2018
CACV 346/2018

[2018] HKCA 719

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 65 OF 2018 and

CIVIL APPEAL NO 346 OF 2018

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL and APPEAL FROM PROBATE ACTION NO 32 OF 2012)

____________

IN THE ESTATE of SANG LEE also known as LI TIN SANG late of 46 Acre Lane, Brixton, London, S.W.2. England, widow, deceased (“the Deceased”)

____________

BETWEEN
LI CHEONG (李昌) Plaintiff

and

LEE KWAI TAI (李桂娣) Defendant
also known as LI KWAI TAI

and

LI SOO TAN (李素丹) Intended Intervener
also known as LEE SOO TAN DOREEN

____________

Before: Hon Lam VP, Yuen JA and Kwan JA
Dates of Intended Intervener’s Submissions: 6 September 2018 and 26 September 2018
Date of Defendant’s Submissions: 19 September 2018
Date of Judgment: 18 October 2018

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J U D G M E N T

_______________________

Hon Yuen JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Background

1. On 26 July 2018, at a rolled-up hearing of which the parties were informed three weeks in advance, this court (Lam VP and Yuen JA) gave leave to the defendant LKT to appeal, and then allowed her appeal, against a decision of DHCJ Yee given on 5 March 2018. The learned judge had granted the intended intervener DL an extension of time to apply to set aside a judgment given on 8 June 2016 in a probate action in which LKT was declared the only surviving issue, and granted letters of administration to the estate, of the deceased who had died in the UK in 1985.

2. The reasons for this court’s judgment have been set out in our Reasons for Judgment handed down on 8 August 2018 and I will not repeat them here.

The application

3. On 22 August 2018, DL filed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under the “otherwise” limb in s.22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance Cap.484. First, DL disputes the grounds for this court’s interference with the exercise of the judge’s exercise of discretion, and the consequent exercise of that discretion afresh by this court. Secondly, it is suggested that under the rolled-up procedure, she was deprived of a fair opportunity to consider and deal with matters taken into account by this court. Thirdly she complains that in the circumstances, she became “unintentionally bound” by the judgment of 8 June 2018.

Discussion

4. In our Reasons for Judgment...

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