Koo Sze Yiu And Another v Chief Executive Of The Hksar

CourtCourt of Final Appeal (Hong Kong)
Judgment Date12 July 2006
Citation[2006] 3 HKLRD 455; (2006) 9 HKCFAR 441
Judgment NumberFACV13/2006
Subject MatterFinal Appeal (Civil)
FACV000012/2006 KOO SZE YIU AND ANOTHER v. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HKSAR

FACV Nos 12 & 13 of 2006

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FINAL APPEAL NOS 12 &13 OF 2006 (CIVIL)

(ON APPEAL FROM CACV NOS 73 & 87 OF 2006)

_____________________

Between:

KOO SZE YIU

1st Appellant

LEUNG KWOK HUNG

2nd Appellant

and

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Respondent

_____________________

Court: Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Mortimer NPJ and Sir Anthony Mason NPJ

Date of Hearing: 5 July 2006

Date of Judgment: 12 July 2006

_____________________

J U D G M E N T

_____________________

Mr Justice Bokhary PJ:

Questions of law

1. Can a court ever, and if so under what circumstances, make an order according temporary validity to a law or executive action which it has declared unconstitutional? Failing such an order, can a court ever, and if so under what circumstances, suspend such a declaration so as to postpone its coming into operation? Those are the questions of law which has reached us in this case. The context is covert surveillance under conditions found to be incompatible with freedom and privacy of communication as constitutionally guaranteed. This guarantee is found in art. 30 of our constitution the Basic Law. Article 30 provides:

“The freedom and privacy of communication of Hong Kong residents shall be protected by law. No department or individual may, on any grounds, infringe upon the freedom and privacy of communication of residents except that the relevant authorities may inspect communication in accordance with legal procedures to meet the needs of public security or of investigation into criminal offences.”

2. Privacy also enjoys constitutional protection under art. 14 of the Bill of Rights as entrenched by art. 39 of the Basic Law. But the breadth of privacy protection provided by art. 30 of the Basic Law leaves no gap for art. 14 of the Bill of Rights to fill in the present context. As to how the present case is to be decided, it makes no difference whether the constitutional provision focused on came into force on 8 June 1991 (as the Bill of Rights did) or on 1 July 1997 (as the Basic Law did).

Covert surveillance

3. By its nature covert surveillance involving the interception of communications impacts upon the privacy of the communications which are intercepted. And the knock-on effect of that is an impact upon freedom of communication, too. For it is only natural that even law-abiding persons will sometimes feel inhibited in communicating at all if they cannot do so with privacy. Nevertheless covert surveillance is an important tool in the detection and prevention of crime and threats to public security i.e. the safety that the public is entitled to enjoy in a free and well-ordered society. The position reached upon a proper balance of the rival considerations is that covert surveillance is not to be prohibited but is to be controlled. Such control must sufficiently protect - and enjoy public confidence that it sufficiently protects - fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly freedom and privacy of communication. The “legal procedures” requirement contained in art. 30 of the Basic Law exists to ensure such protection.

Proposed scheme of the Interception of Communications Ordinance

4. On 27 June 1997 the Interception of Communications Ordinance, Cap. 532 (“the IOCO”) was passed. It is, according to its long title, “[a]n Ordinance to provide laws on and in connection with the interception of communications transmitted by post or by means of a telecommunication system and to repeal section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance”.

5. Broadly stated the proposed scheme of the IOCO is one for the prohibition of any interception of communication by post or telecommunications save where such interception is authorised by the order of a High Court judge. I describe that scheme as “proposed” because the IOCO has not come into operation. This is because s.1(2) of the IOCO provides that “[t]his Ordinance shall come into operation on a day to be appointed by the Governor by notice in the Gazette”. But neither the Governor prior to the handover nor either Chief Executive since has appointed such a day.

Section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance

6. Section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance, Cap. 106 (“the TO”) had been enacted in 1963 to provide that:

“Whenever he considers that the public interest so requires, the Governor, or any public officer authorized in that behalf by the Governor either generally or for any particular occasion, may order that any message or any class of messages brought for transmission by telecommunication shall not be transmitted or that any message or any class of messages brought for transmission, or transmitted or received or being transmitted, by telecommunication shall be intercepted or detained or disclosed to the Government or to the public officer specified in the order.”

The omission to bring the IOCO into operation left s.33 of the TO on the statute book.

Executive Order

7. Doubts over the constitutionality of covert surveillance as practised by law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong had been growing over the years. Such doubts developed into an acute problem by reason of what the District Court said in two criminal cases in 2005. On 5 August 2005, with a view to coping with this problem by way of an interim measure pending corrective legislation, the Chief Executive published an executive order meant to serve as a set of “legal procedures” for the purposes of art. 30 of the Basic Law.

8. In resorting to an executive order the Chief Executive no doubt had in mind art. 48 of Basic Law by which it is provided that his powers and functions include issuing executive orders. The full name given to the executive order published on 5 August 2005 is the Law Enforcement (Covert Surveillance Procedure) Order. I will refer to it simply as “the Executive Order”.

9. The arrangement brought about by the Executive Order is a departmental one. It requires that covert surveillance be conducted only where authorised at a fairly senior level, and be kept under regular review at an even more senior level.

Judicial review challenge

10. Within a very short time of its publication the Executive Order came under challenge in the judicial review proceedings out of which the present appeal arises. The proceedings were commenced by Mr Leung Kwok Hung and Mr Koo Sze Yiu against the Chief Executive. Mr Leung and Mr Koo attacked three things as unconstitutional: (i) the Executive Order; (ii) s.33 of the TO; and (iii) the Chief Executive’s omission to bring the IOCO into operation. In broad terms the attack can be said to be against covert surveillance as practised by law enforcement agencies in Hong Kong.

11. As to their standing to bring such an attack by way of judicial review, Mr Leung and Mr Koo rely on two matters. For their standing of the conventional kind, they rely on their avowed belief that, as political activists who have had their brushes with the law, they were themselves targets of covert surveillance. They also assert the right to maintain a facial challenge. For their standing to maintain such a challenge, they rely on their interest, as members of the public, in seeing that covert surveillance is not practised save constitutionally. The courts below did not treat them as bereft of standing. Nor, however the matter is best analysed, would I.

12. On 9 February 2006 the High Court (Hartmann J) gave judgment against Mr Leung and Mr Koo on the IOCO, finding nothing unlawful in the omission to bring it into operation. But he gave judgment in their favour on the Executive Order and on s.33 of the TO. His declarations thereon were to the following effect. The Executive Order comprises administrative directions only and does not constitute a set of “legal procedures” for the purposes of art. 30 of the Basic Law. And s.33 of the TO is unconstitutional in so far as it authorises access to or the disclosure of the contents of any message or class of messages.

Courts below make and affirm a temporary validity order

13. At the same time i.e. 9 February 2006 and to provide a six-month stop-gap measure pending corrective legislation, Hartmann J made, at the Government’s request, what I would describe as a “temporary validity order”, doing so in the following terms:

“Notwithstanding the judgment of the court and the declarations herein, section 33 of the Telecommunications Ordinance and the Executive Order, are valid and of legal effect for a period of six months from the date hereof, the parties having liberty to apply”.

14. The case then proceeded to the Court of Appeal. Mr Leung and Mr Koo both appealed against the temporary validity order. On his own Mr Leung appealed against the refusal of relief in respect of the omission to bring the IOCO into operation. And the Government cross-appealed against the declaration that the Executive Order did not constitute a set of “legal procedures” for the purposes of art. 30 of the Basic Law. But the Government did not cross-appeal against the declaration regarding s.33 of the TO.

15. On 10 May 2006 the Court of Appeal (Stuart-Moore VP and Yeung and Tang JJA) dismissed the appeals and the cross-appeal, doing so by a judgment given by Tang JA for the court. On the same day Mr Koo took out a notice of motion seeking the Court of Appeal’s leave to appeal to us. Mr Leung took out his notice of motion on the following day. On 19 May 2006 the Court of Appeal granted both of them leave to appeal to us. Mr Koo filed his notice of appeal on 23 May 2006 (and was assigned the final appeal number 12 of 2006). On the...

Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI

Get Started for Free

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

Unlock full access with a free 7-day trial

Transform your legal research with vLex

  • Complete access to the largest collection of common law case law on one platform

  • Generate AI case summaries that instantly highlight key legal issues

  • Advanced search capabilities with precise filtering and sorting options

  • Comprehensive legal content with documents across 100+ jurisdictions

  • Trusted by 2 million professionals including top global firms

  • Access AI-Powered Research with Vincent AI: Natural language queries with verified citations

vLex

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT