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Hong Kong Housing Society v Tang Kar Hung

Judgment Cited authorities 1 Cited in Precedent Map Related
Vincent
Judgment Date19 January 2000
Subject MatterCivil Appeal
Judgement NumberCACV153/1999
CourtCourt of Appeal (Hong Kong)
CACV000153A/1999 HONG KONG HOUSING SOCIETY v. TANG KAR HUNG

CACV000153A/1999

CACV 153/99

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 153 OF 1999

(ON APPEAL FROM HCCT NO. 91 OF 1998)

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BETWEEN
HONG KONG HOUSING SOCIETY Plaintiff
AND
TANG KAR HUNG Defendant

______________

Coram: Leong JA and Keith JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 19 January 2000

Date of Delivery of Judgment: 19 January 2000

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J U D G M E N T

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Keith JA (giving the first judgment at the invitation of Leong JA):

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the dismissal by the Court of Appeal of the appeal of Tang Kar Hung from the order of Findlay J giving the Hong Kong Housing Society ("the Society") summary judgment against Mr Tang under Ord. 14 for the sum of $21.8m. plus interest. Mr Ben Beaumont for Mr Tang contends that an order for summary judgment under Ord. 14 is a final judgment, with the consequence that Mr Tang is entitled to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal as of right.

2. The Appellate Committee of the Court of Final Appeal has recently held in Wai Hung Stationery Co. v. HKSAR [1998] 1 HKLRD 445 that the "applications" test is the correct test, namely that an order will only be regarded as final if it would finally have determined the proceedings whichever way the application which resulted in the order would have been decided. It follows that an order for summary judgment under Ord. 14 is not a final order because, had the defendant been granted leave to defend the action, the action would have continued. In those circumstances, leave to appeal can only be granted to Mr Tang at the court's discretion under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484).

3. Mr Beaumont's skeleton argument sets out four questions of great general or public importance which the appeal is said to involve. The first three questions relate to the letters of demand:

(i) Compliance. The question is whether a guarantee or performance bond can only be activated if the terms for its activation are strictly complied with, or whether substantial compliance with those terms is sufficient. In my view, that question does not arise because the Court of Appeal found, whatever the correct test was, that the letters of demand satisfied the more stringent test.
(ii) Delegation. The question is whether the Society's opinion that Hing Lee was in default of the construction contracts or the supplementary
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